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a b s t r a c t
It is a well-known result in the theory of simple games that a game is weighted if and
only if it is trade robust. In this paper we propose a variant of trade robustness, that we
call invariant-trade robustness, which is enough to determine whether a simple game is
weighted. To test whether a simple game is invariant-trade robust we do not need to
consider all winning coalitions; a reduced subset ofminimal winning coalitions is enough.
We make a comparison between the two methods (trade robustness and invariant-
trade robustness) to check whether a simple game is weighted. We also provide by means
of algorithms a full classification using both methods, for simple games with less than 8
voters according to the maximum level of (invariant-)trade robustness they achieve.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Simple games can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment,
is pitted against the status quo.
Definition 1.1. A simple game G is a pair (N,W) in which N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and W is a collection of subsets of N that
satisfies: (1) N ∈ W , (2) ∅ 6∈ W and (3) themonotonicity property: S ∈ W and S ⊆ T ⊆ N implies T ∈ W .
Any set of voters is called a coalition, and the set N is called the grand coalition. Members of N are called players or
voters, and the subsets of N that are in W are called winning coalitions. Our definition of simple game demands that the
grand coalition is winning and the empty coalition is losing. The gain, albeit small, in the exclusion of these two innocuous
examples is in the interpretation of simple games as voting systems.
The intuition here is that a set S is a winning coalition if and only if the bill or amendment passes when the players in S
are precisely the ones who voted for it. A subset of N that is not inW is called a losing coalition. Aminimal winning coalition
is a winning coalition all of whose proper subsets are losing. Because of monotonicity, any simple game is completely
determined by its set of minimal winning coalitions, which is denoted by Wm. A voter a ∈ N is null if he/she/it does not
belong to any minimal winning coalition.
Before proceeding, we introduce some real-world examples of simple games (see Taylor [8] for a thorough presentation
of these examples).
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Example 1.2. The European Economic Community (1958). In 1958, the Treaty of Rome established the existence of a binary
voting system called the European Economic Community. The voters in this systemwere the following six countries: France,
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. France, Germany and Italy were given four votes each, while
Belgium and the Netherlands were given two votes and Luxembourg one. Passage required at least twelve of the seventeen
votes. The European Economic Community was altered several times with the addition of new countries and a reallocation
of votes. The current version was approved in the Nice European summit, held in December 2000.
Example 1.3. The United Nations Security Council. The voters in this system are the fifteen countries that make up the
Security Council, five of which are permanent members whereas the other ten are non-permanent members. Passage
requires a total of at least nine of the fifteen possible votes, subject to a veto due to a nay vote from any one of the
five permanent members. This model ignores abstention. For a treatment of this example considering the possibility of
abstention we refer the reader to [4].
Example 1.4. The United States Federal System. There are 537 voters in this system: 435 members of the House of
Representatives, 100 members of the Senate, the vice president, and the president. The vice president plays the role of
tie-breaker in the Senate, and the president has veto power that can be overridden by a two–thirds vote of both the House
and the Senate. Thus, for a bill to pass it must be supported by either: 218 or more representatives and 51 or more senators
(with or without the vice president) and the president; 218 or more representatives and 50 senators and the vice president
and the president; or 290 or more representatives and 67 or more senators (with or without either the vice president or the
president).
Example 1.5. The System to Amend the Canadian Constitution. Since 1982, an amendment to the Canadian Constitution can
become law only if it is approved by at least seven of the ten Canadian provinces, subject to the proviso that the approving
provinces have, among them, at least half of Canada’s population. It was first studied in Kilgour [6]. A census (in percentages)
for the Canadian provinces was: Prince Edward Island (1%), Newfoundland (3%), New Brunswick (3%), Nova Scotia (4%),
Manitoba (5%), Saskatchewan (5%), Alberta (7%), British Columbia (9%), Quebec (29%) and Ontario (34%).
Note that coalitions (wemake use of abridgements to denote the provinces hereafter) S1 = {PEI,New,Man, Sas, Alb, BC,
Que} and S2 = {NB,NS,Man, Sas, Alb, BC,Ont} are minimal winning coalitions because they both have exactly 7
provinces and their total population surpasses the 50% of the total Canada’s population. Instead, coalitions T1 =
{Man, Sas, Alb, BC,Que,Ont} and T2 = {PEI,New,NB,NS,Man, Sas, Alb, BC} are both losing because T1 does not have 7
members and T2 does not reach the 50% of the total Canada’s population.
Of fundamental importance to us are the classes of weighted simple games and complete simple games.
Definition 1.6. A simple game G = (N,W) is said to be weighted if there exists a ‘‘weight function’’ w : N → R and a
‘‘quota’’ q ∈ R such that a coalition S is winning precisely when the sum of the weights of the players in S meets or exceeds
the quota.
Any specific example of such aweight functionw : N → R and quota q as in Definition 1.6 are said to realize G as a weighted
game. A particular realization of a weighted simple game is denoted as [q;w1, . . . , wn].
For instance, [q;
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1] for some q = 1, . . . , n is a feasible realization for a weighted game; here the game is called a
q–out–of –n simple game. Example 1.2 corresponds to [12; 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1]where 4 is theweight assigned to France, Germany
and Italy, 2 the weight assigned to Belgium and the Netherlands and 1 the weight assigned to Luxembourg. A realization of
Example 1.3 is [39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]where 7 is the weight for a permanent member and 1 the weight
for a non-permanent member.
Simple games and in particular weighted games and complete games, which we will introduce later, have been studied
in a variety of different mathematical contexts: Boolean or switching functions, threshold logic, hypergraphs, coherent
structures, Sperner systems, and clutters, among others. One of the most important problems for all these fields is to
determinewhether a simple game canbe realized as aweighted simple game. The only results giving necessary and sufficient
conditions can be found under one of the next three topics:
(i) Geometric approach based on separating hyperplanes;
(ii) Algebraic approach based on systems of linear inequalities;
(iii) Approach based on trading transforms.
The geometric approach requires translating the question of weightedness into one of separability via a hyperplane
separating two convex subsets of Rn. The basic idea in the algebraic approach involves translating weightedness via vector
sums into conditions equivalent to the solvability of systems of linear inequalities. The approach based on trades suggests
several interpretations thatwill be tackled here froma theoretical and computational viewpoint. See Taylor and Zwicker [11]
for more details on these three approaches.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces some definitions and discusses the properties of m-
trade robustness andm-asummability. Section 3 recalls the desirability relation and a classification theorem for the class of
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complete simple games, those for which the desirability relation is total. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper
(Theorems 4.3 and 4.7) and proposes a variant of trade robustness, which we call invariant-trade robustness, it allows
us to determine whether a simple game is weighted. In general, the invariant-trade robustness test we propose involves
considerable simplification about trade robustness. However, in Section 5 we also prove (Theorem 5.1) the existence of
games with long failures of invariant-trade robustness but with short failures of trade robustness. In Section 6 we provide a
full classification for complete simple games with less than 8 voters according to either they are weighted or the achieved
first failure of beingm-trade robust and k-invariant-trade robust. Conclusion and future work end the paper.
2. Trade robustness and asummability
Elgot [2] characterizes threshold switching functions (here, weighted games) via the ‘‘asummability’’ property (the proof
is also in [7]). Taylor and Zwicker use a related property, ‘‘trade robustness,’’ to characterize weighted simple games within
the class of simple games. Quite recently, Freixas and Zwicker [4] consider a new class of games, (j, k)-simple games,
i.e., games with j ≥ 2 levels of approval in the input and k ≥ 2 levels of approval in the output. The characterization of
weighted (j, k)-simple games is established by ‘‘grade trade robustness’’. In particular, simple games correspond to (2, 2)-
simple games in this wider context and grade trade robustness coincides with trade robustness if (j, k) = (2, 2). If j = 3
it means that voters are allowed to vote in favor, to abstain or to vote against; whereas k = 3 means that the output has
3 different possibilities. It turns out that grading systems provide natural examples of voting systems with several input
and output levels. All we do in this paper can be easily rephrased for these games because the notion of δ-minimal winning
coalition has full sense in the context of games with several levels of approval.
From now on, we are exclusively concerned with simple games. Loosely speaking, a simple game is m-trade robust if it
is impossible to transform a sequence of m winning coalitions into a sequence of m losing coalitions via trades. As noticed
by Taylor and Zwicker in [10], if this definition is made cumulative, required to hold for each j ≤ m, and rephrased in the
language of threshold logic, then it becomes the definition of m-asummable. Thus we will use hereafter the term ‘‘trade
robust.’’
Definition 2.1. Suppose G = (N,W) is a simple game. Then a trading transform (for G) is a coalition sequence J =
〈S1, . . . , Sj, T1, . . . , Tj〉 (from G) satisfying the following condition:
|{i : a ∈ Si}| = |{i : a ∈ Ti}| for all a ∈ N. (1)
The Ss are called the pre-trade coalitions and the Ts the post-trade coalitions, and we will say that 〈S1, . . . , Sj〉 has been
converted by a trade to 〈T1, . . . , Tj〉.
Definition 2.2. An m-trade for a simple game G is a trading transform J = 〈S1, . . . , Sj, T1, . . . , Tj〉 in which j ≤ m. The
simple game G ism-trade robust if there is no m-trade J for which all the Ss are winning in G and all the Ts are losing in G.
If G ism-trade robust for all positive integerm, then G is said to be trade robust.
Informally, G is m-trade robust if a sequence of m or fewer (not necessarily distinct) winning coalitions can never be
rendered losing by a trade.
Theorem 2.3 (Taylor and Zwicker, [9]). For a simple game G = (N,W), the following are equivalent:
(i) G is weighted.
(ii) G is trade robust.
(iii) G is 22
|N|
-trade robust.
Notice that a naive checking of (iii) is a finite (albeit lengthy) process, whereas a naive checking of weightedness directly
is an infinite process. Moreover, Theorem 2.3 actually provides a fairly simple and uniform procedure for showing that
certain games are not weighted: one produces a sequence of winning coalitions and indicates trades among these winning
coalitions that convert all of them into losing coalitions.
In Example 1.5 we have seen that the trading transform J = 〈S1, S2, T1, T2〉 converts the winning coalitions S1 and S2
into the losing ones T1 and T2. Therefore, by Theorem 2.3, the system is not weighted.
Example 2.4. Another complex voting system is the current European Economic Community. The countries are: Germany,
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, The Netherlands, Greece, Czech Republic, Belgium, Hungary,
Portugal, Sweden, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovak Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus,
Luxembourg and Malta. They are represented by the set {1, 2, . . . , 27} where Germany = 1, United Kingdom = 2, and
so on.
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The first decision rule is the simple game given by v1 ∩ v2 ∩ v3,1 where the three weighted voting games corresponding
to votes, countries and population, are the following:
v1 = [255; 29, 29, 29, 29, 27, 27, 14, 13, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 10, 10, 10, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3],
v2 = [14; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
v3 = [620; 170, 123, 122, 120, 82, 80, 47, 33, 22, 21, 21, 21, 21, 18, 17, 17, 11, 11, 11, 8, 8, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1].
Freixas [3] proves that this voting system cannot be expressed as a single weighted game or as the intersection of two
weighted games. That is, this example is a real-world example of dimension 3. To see that it fails to be 2-trade robust, we
may consider coalitions S1 = T1 \ {14, 15, 17} ∪ {3} and S2 = T2 \ {3} ∪ {14, 15, 17}where T1 = [1, 2] ∪ [5, 19] ∪ {26} and
T2 = [1, 13] (if i ≤ jwe write [i, j] = {k ∈ N : i ≤ k ≤ j}). The corresponding weights are:
v1 v2 v3
S1 256 16 803
S2 255 15 897
v1 v2 v3
T1 254 18 727
T2 257 13 883
So, after trades, the losing coalitions T1 and T2 in v convert into the winning coalitions S1 and S2; consequently, game v
cannot be weighted because, after the trade, S1 and S2 cannot simultaneously gain weight.
The question of whether any bounded amount of trade robustness implies weightedness was settled by Taylor and
Zwicker.
Theorem 2.5 (Taylor and Zwicker, [10]). For each integer m ≥ 2, there exists a simple game Gm with (m + 1)2 players, that is
m-trade robust, but not (m+ 1)-trade robust.
However, Winder [12] produces, for each m ≥ 3, a game (actually, a switching function) that is m-trade robust, but not
pi(m)-trade robust (hence, notweighted). Here,pi is a function satisfyingpi(m) > m and having a fairly complex description.
Theorem 2.5 suggests that it would be interesting to find out whether there are games with fewer than (m + 1)2 players
that are m-trade robust but not (m + 1)-trade robust. For instance, the game that appears in Theorem 5.3.1 in [11] has 14
players, is 3-trade robust, but not 4-trade robust.
3. The desirability relation and complete simple games
Definition 3.1. Suppose G = (N,W) is a simple game. Then G is said to be swap robust if a one–for–one exchange between
two winning coalitions can never render both losing.
Thus, swap robustness differs from trade robustness in two ways: the trades involve only two coalitions, and the
exchanges are one–for–one. That is to say, swap robustness considersm-trades of the following type:m = 2, T1 = S1 \ {a}
and T2 = S2 ∪ {a} for some a ∈ S1 and a 6∈ S2, and winning coalitions S1 and S2. It is fairly easy to generate simple games
that are not swap robust.
A ‘‘desirability relation’’ represents a way to make precise the idea that a particular voting systemmay give to one voter
more influence than another. Isbell already used it in [5].
Definition 3.2. Let G = (N,W) be a simple game, a and b be two voters. Player a is said to be (strictly)more desirable than
b, denoted by a  b, if the next two conditions are fulfilled:
(i) For every coalition S such that a 6∈ S and b 6∈ S, S ∪ {b} ∈ W implies S ∪ {a} ∈ W .
(ii) There exists a coalition T such that a 6∈ T and b 6∈ T , T ∪ {a} ∈ W and T ∪ {b} 6∈ W .
Definition 3.3. Let (N,W) be a simple game, a and b be two voters. Players a and b are said to be equally desirable, denoted
by a ∼ b, if for any coalition S such that a 6∈ S and b 6∈ S, S ∪ {a} ∈ W if and only if S ∪ {b} ∈ W .
The desirability relation, denoted by %, is defined in N as follows: a % b if a  b or a ∼ b, we say that a is at least as desirable
as b as coalitional partner. It is straightforward to check that∼ is an equivalence relation, and that % is a partial ordering of
the resulting equivalence classes.
Definition 3.4. A simple game (N,W) is complete (or linear) if the desirability relation is a complete preordering.
In a complete simple game we may decompose N in a collection of subsets, called classes, N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt forming
a partition of N and understanding that if a ∈ Np and b ∈ Nq then: p = q if and only if a ∼ b and, p < q if and only if a  b.
The following theorem is a characterization of complete simple games.
1 A coalition wins in the intersection game if and only if it wins in each individual game.
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Theorem 3.5 (Taylor and Zwicker, [11]). G is a complete simple game if and only if G is swap robust.
For a weighted game G, w(i) ≥ w(j) implies i % j, so G is complete. Thus, complete simple games properly
include weighted simple games. Carreras and Freixas [1] provide a classification theorem for complete simple games, here
Theorem 3.9, that allows us to enumerate all these games up to isomorphism by listing the possible values of certain
invariants. An advantage of using the classification theorem is that it usually allows working with a smaller number of
vectors than would be required with minimal winning coalitions. Before introducing a notion of trade-robustness based on
these invariants, we need some preliminaries.
Definition 3.6. Given n = (n1, . . . , nt) ∈ Nt , then Λ(n) = {m ∈ (N ∪ {0})t : m ≤ n} is the set of all vectors
m = (m1, . . . ,mt) whose components satisfy 0 ≤ mk ≤ nk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t . In Λ(n) the δ-ordering given by the
comparison of partial sums is:
mδp if and only if
k∑
i=1
mi ≥
k∑
i=1
pi for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t.
Moreover,
(i) Ifmδpwe will say that vectorm δ-dominates vector p.
(ii) Ifm 6= p andmδpwe will say thatm strictly δ-dominates p.
(iii) Ifmδ/p and pδ/mwe will say thatm and p are not δ-comparable.
From now on, we shall writeΣk(m) =∑ki=1mi for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t andΣ(m) = (Σ1(m), . . . ,Σt(m)), so that mδp if and
only if Σ(m) ≥ Σ(p). It is not difficult to check that the couple (Λ(n), δ) is a distributive lattice. To make clearer the next
theorem we need the following.
Definition 3.7. The profile mi ∈ Λ(n) is lexicographically ordered above the profile mh ∈ Λ(n) if there exists some l such
thatΣk(mi) = Σk(mh) for all k < l andΣl(mi) > Σl(mh).
Definition 3.8. Two simple games G = (N,W) and G′ = (N ′,W ′) are said to be isomorphic if there is a bijective map
f : N → N ′ such that S ∈ W if and only if f (S) ∈ W ′; f is called an isomorphism of simple games.
The next theorem has three parts. The first part shows how to associate a vector n and a matrixM to a complete simple
game G = (N,W) and describes the restrictions that these parameters need to fulfill. The second part establishes that
isomorphic complete simple games G = (N,W) and G′ = (N ′,W ′) correspond to the same associated vector n and matrix
M (uniqueness). The third part shows that a vector n and a matrix M fulfilling the conditions in part A correspond to a
complete simple game G = (N,W) (existence).
Theorem 3.9 (Carreras and Freixas, [1]).
Part A Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game with nonempty classes N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt and let n be the vector defined
by their cardinalities. For each S ∈ W we consider the profile s ∈ Λ(n)with components sk = |S∩Nk|, and letM = (mi,j)
be the matrix whose r rows are the profiles corresponding to winning coalitions that do not δ-dominate any other profile
corresponding to winning coalitions. Then the vector n and the matrixM associated to the complete simple game G satisfy
the following properties:
(1) mi,j ∈ N ∪ {0} and 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t;
(2) every pair of different rows of M are not δ-comparable;
(3) if t = 1 then m1,1 > 0; if t > 1 then for every k < t there exists some h such that mh,k > 0 and mh,(k+1) < nk+1;
and
(4) the rows of M are ordered by partial sums in descending lexicographic order.
Part B (Uniqueness) Two complete simple games G = (N,W) and G′ = (N ′,W ′) are isomorphic if and only if n = n′ and
M =M′.
Part C (Existence) Given a vector n and a matrix M satisfying the conditions of part A, there exists a complete simple game
G = (N,W) associated to vector n and matrixM.
We need now to describe how to get (n,M) from (N,W) and conversely.
As (N,W) is a complete simple game either a  b, or a ∼ b, or b  a for all pair of voters. Voters being equally desirable
are grouped in classes Nk and the previous notation, introduced just after Definition 3.4, Np > Nq (p < q) means that a  b
for each a ∈ Np and b ∈ Nq. Let N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt . Components of vector n = (n1, . . . , nt) are defined by nk = |Nk|.
Rows ofM are obtained in the following way: for each S ∈ W we consider the associated vector s ∈ Λ(n)with components
sk = |S ∩ Nk|. Vector s is a row ofM if it does not δ-dominate any other profile corresponding to winning coalitions. Once
the rows ofM are determined we list them in descending lexicographic order. From all this it is clear that (n,M) obtained
from (N,W) fulfills conditions (1), (2) and (4) in Theorem 3.9(A). If condition (3) fails for some 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1 then it can be
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Table 1
Models for minimal winning coalitions
Model Number Minimal winning coalitions
(1, 0, 0, 2) 1 {1, 5, 6}
(0, 1, 1, 1) 4 {2, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6}
(1, 0, 1, 1) 4 {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 6}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}
(1, 0, 2, 0) 1 {1, 3, 4}
(0, 1, 2, 0) 1 {2, 3, 4}
(1, 1, 0, 1) 2 {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}
(1, 1, 1, 0) 2 {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}
shown that elements in Nj and elements in Nj+1 will be equally desirable voters, which would be a contradiction (the details
of the proof are in Carreras and Freixas [1]).
Conversely, given a vector n = (n1, . . . , nt) and a matrixM with r rows and t columns. Let n = Σt(n) be the number of
players, N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players, and N1,N2, . . . ,Nt be subsets of N formed, respectively, by n1, n2, . . . , nt
elements (whichmay be chosen following the natural ordering). By Theorem 3.9(A), none of these subsets is empty. For each
rowmi inM, we consider coalitions R ⊆ N satisfying |R ∩ Nj| = mi,j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t , these coalitions are called δ-minimal
winning coalitions; now the set of winning coalitions is
W = {S ⊆ N : sδmi for some row mi ofM}.
Theorem 3.9 is a parametrization theorem because it allows us to enumerate all complete games up to isomorphism by
listing the possible values of certain invariants. Let us consider the examples previously introduced. We may easily deduce
that the characteristic invariants of Example 1.2 are:
n = (3, 2, 1) and M =
(
3 0 0
2 2 0
)
.
The characteristic invariants for Example 1.3 are: n = (5, 10) and M = (5 4). For Example 1.5 we obtain n = (2, 8)
andM = (1 6). On the contrary, Example 1.4 is not complete so it cannot be represented by means of the characteristic
invariants. Although the voting system of the current European Economic Community is complete, its representation using
characteristic invariants is a bit complex (and it will be omitted).
We describe two examples to illustrate how to get (n,M) from (N,W) and (N,W) from (n,M).
Example 3.10. Let (N,W) be the game with n = 6 voters defined by
Wm = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6},
{1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 6}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 5, 6},
{2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6}, {2, 5, 6}}.
It is straightforward to check that: 1 ∼ 2, 3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5 ∼ 6, and i  j if i = {1, 2} and j = {3, 4, 5, 6}. Thus, me may define
N1 = {1, 2} and N2 = {3, 4, 5, 6} and therefore n = (2, 4). Coalitions in Wm correspond to either model (2, 1) or (1, 2).
Because (2, 1)δ(1, 2) and (1, 2)δ/(2, 1), matrixM has a unique row (1 2). Thus, the characteristic invariants associated to
game (N,W) are:
n = (2, 4) and M = (1 2).
Note that model (1, 2) corresponds to 12 δ-minimal winning coalitions: {1, 3, 4}, . . . , {2, 5, 6}, whereas (2, 1) corresponds
to the remaining 4 minimal winning coalitions: {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}.
Example 3.11. Consider the unique complete simple game defined by the invariants:
n = (1, 1, 2, 2) and M =
(
1 0 0 2
0 1 1 1
)
which satisfy the four conditions in Theorem 3.9(A). The number of voters is n = Σ4(n) = 6. Let N = {1, . . . , 6} be the set
of players. Then 1  2  3 ∼ 4  5 ∼ 6. The δ-minimal winning coalitions are given bymodels: (1, 0, 0, 2) and (0, 1, 1, 1),
and the remaining winning coalitions by models: (1, 0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 2, 0), (0, 1, 2, 0), (1, 1, 0, 1) and (1, 1, 1, 0). The game
(N,W) is described by means of its 15 minimal winning coalitions which appear in the third column of Table 1.
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4. A reformulation of trade robustness for complete simple games
In this main section we reformulate the notion of trade robustness introduced in Section 2, for a complete simple game
defined by its characteristic invariants, (n,M).
For the purpose of studying whether a game is weighted in terms of trade robustness we may confine our analysis to
study only complete simple games, because the remaining simple games are not swap robust (cf. Theorem 3.5) which is
the simplest case of not being 2-trade robust. Within the framework of complete simple games we can take advantage of
using the equivalent representation (n,M) for (N,W), which allows usingmodels of coalitions. This latter property becomes
essential to develop algorithms for classifying all games for some few voters. The basic idea of working with vectors which
are rows ofM instead of coalitions is that it makes the notion of trade robustness more manageable, as will be illustrated
in the remaining sections.
Definition 4.1 (cf. Definition 2.1). Suppose G = (N,W) is a complete simple game. Then a δ-trading transform (for G) is a
coalition sequence J = 〈S1, . . . , Sj, T1, . . . , Tj〉 (from G) satisfying condition |{i : a ∈ Si}| = |{i : a ∈ Ti}| for all a ∈ N ,
where S1, . . . , Sj are δ-minimal winning coalitions.
Definition 4.2 (cf. Definition 2.2). An m-δ-trade for a complete simple game G is a δ-trading transform J =
〈S1, . . . , Sj, T1, . . . , Tj〉 in which j ≤ m. A complete simple game G is m-δ-trade robust if there is no m-δ-trade J such that
all the Ss are δ-minimal winning coalitions in G and all the Ts are losing in G. If G ism-δ-trade robust for all positive integer
m, then G is said to be δ-trade robust.
Loosely speaking,G ism-δ-trade robust if a sequence ofm or fewer (not necessarily distinct) δ-minimalwinning coalitions
can never be rendered losing by a trade.
Theorem 4.3. Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game. Then, G is m-trade robust for all m if and only if G is k-δ-trade robust
for all k.
Proof. (⇒) This part is clear since δ-minimal winning coalitions are also winning coalitions, so that m-trade robustness
impliesm-δ-trade robustness for all positive integerm. Hence, if G is trade robust then it is δ-trade robust.
(⇐) If G is not m-trade robust for some m, then there exists a trading transform J = 〈S1, . . . , Sj, T1, . . . , Tj〉 in which
j ≤ mwith all the S ′s being winning and all the T ′s being losing.
If some of the coalitions Ss are notminimal thenwemay remove elements in them to convert the Ss intominimalwinning
coalitions. Removing arbitrarily the same elements in the Ts give rise to new losing coalitions. Hence, from now on we can
assume that all the Ss in J are minimal winning coalitions.
To show a failure of k-δ-trade robustness we will construct a trading transform from J:
J′ = 〈S ′1, . . . , S ′j , S ′j+1, . . . , S ′j′ , T ′1, . . . , T ′j , T ′j+1, . . . , T ′j′〉
in which j ≤ m and j′ − j ≥ 0 with all the S ′s being δ-minimal winning coalitions and all the T ′s being losing coalitions.
We start with S1 in J. If it is a δ-minimal winning coalition, then we set S ′1 = S1 and consider S2 following for it the
analogous procedure described below for S1.
If S1 is not a δ-minimal winning coalition we may transform it to this status by replacing some elements in S1 by others
which lay below in the desirability order. Indeed, let a be one of these elements in S1 replaced by b which lies below a in
the desirability order to get (S1 \ {a}) ∪ {b}. To compensate, and if it is possible, voter a will be replaced by b in one of the
Ts. This preserves (T \ {a}) ∪ {b} losing, since T is so. If such a T does not exist then we consider a new δ-minimal winning
coalition S ′j+1 such that a ∈ S ′j+1 and b 6∈ S ′j+1. This coalition exists, since Condition 3 in Theorem 3.9(A) guarantees it. Then
we set T ′j+1 = (S ′j+1 \ {a}) ∪ {b}which is losing since S ′j+1 is δ-minimal winning and b lies below a in the desirability order.
If (S1 \ {a}) ∪ {b} is not a δ-minimal winning coalition then we consider a new pair of elements a′ ∈ ((S1 \ {a}) ∪ {b}),
b′ 6∈ ((S1 \ {a}) ∪ {b}) and replacing a′ by b′ which lies below a′ in the desirability order to get (S1 \ {a, a′}) ∪ {b, b′}. To
compensate, and if it is possible, voter a′ will be replaced by b′ in one of the T ′1, . . . , T
′
j , T
′
j+1 (some T ′s might coincide with
the original Ts). This preserves (T ′ \ {a′}) ∪ {b′} losing, since T ′ is (here T ′ stands for one of the T ′i for i = 1, . . . , j + 1). If
such T ′ does not exist then we consider a new δ-minimal winning coalition S ′j+2 such that a′ ∈ S ′j+2 and b′ 6∈ S ′j+2. Again, this
coalition exists because of Condition 3 in Theorem 3.9(A). Then we set T ′j+2 = ((S ′j+2 \ {a′})∪ {b′})which is losing since S ′j+2
is δ-minimal winning and b′ lies below a′ in the desirability order. If (S1 \ {a, a′})∪ {b, b′} is a δ-minimal winning coalition,
then we set S ′1 = ((S1 \ {a, a′})∪ {b, b′}) and consider S2. Otherwise, we follow the same argument described above, which
is finite, to get S ′1 being δ-minimal winning.
Then we would consider S2 and following the same process till Sj. After a finite number of steps we will obtain a trading
transform
J′ = 〈S ′1, . . . , S ′j , S ′j+1, . . . , S ′j′ , T ′1, . . . , T ′j , T ′j+1, . . . , T ′j′〉
in which j ≤ m and j′ − j ≥ 0 with all the S ′s being δ-minimal winning coalitions and all the T ′s being losing coalitions,
showing therefore a failure of k-δ-trade robustness for some k. 
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If we start by a failure to bem-trade robustness the proof given above is constructive in the sense we can get a failure of
k-δ-trade robustness for some k.
Note that for a given δ-trading transform 〈S1, . . . , Sj, T1, . . . , Tj〉 for G, we may associate a unique ‘‘vectorial’’ trading
transform 〈x1, . . . , xj, y1, . . . , yj〉 satisfying xi = (|Si ∩N1|, . . . , |Si ∩Nt |) and yi = (|Ti ∩N1|, . . . , |Ti ∩Nt |) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
By Equality (1) we have:∑
a∈Nk
|{i : a ∈ Si}| =
∑
a∈Nk
|{i : a ∈ Ti}| for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t.
But
∑j
i=1 xi,k =
∑
a∈Nk |{i : a ∈ Si}| and
∑j
i=1 yi,k =
∑
a∈Nk |{i : a ∈ Ti}|, and therefore both numbers coincide. Such
equality suggests the following vectorial notion of a trading transform.
Definition 4.4. LetG = (N,W)be a complete simple gamewith characteristic invariants (n,M). A vectorial invariant trading
transform for G is a vectorial sequence J = 〈x1, . . . , xj, y1, . . . , yj〉 satisfying the next conditions:
j∑
i=1
xi,k =
j∑
i=1
yi,k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t (2)
where x1, . . . , xj are arbitrary rows ofM with repetitions allowed, and y1, . . . , yj belong toΛ(n).
Definition 4.4 means that for all component 1 ≤ k ≤ t the sum of the kthxs components coincides with the sum of the
kthys components.
Definition 4.5. An m-invariant-trading transform for a complete simple game G = (N,W), with characteristic invariants
(n,M), is a vectorial invariant-trading transform J = 〈x1, . . . , xj, y1, . . . , yj〉 in which j ≤ m. The complete simple game G
ism-invariant-trade robust if there is no vectorial trading transform J satisfying ylδ/mi for all 1 ≤ l ≤ j and all rowmi ofM.
If G ism-invariant-trade robust for all positive integerm, then G is invariant-trade robust.
The next proposition states that Definitions 4.4 and 4.5 merely correspond to Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 if the game G is
complete and we consider the context (n,M) instead of (N,W). The proof is omitted because it straightforwardly follows
from Theorem 4.3 and the subsequent explanations.
Proposition 4.6. Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game. Then, G is m-trade robust for all m if and only if G is k-invariant-
trade robust for all k.
Theorem 2.3 by Taylor and Zwicker [11] for simple games can be adapted to complete simple games as follows.
Theorem 4.7. Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game and n be the number of voters of N. Then,
(i) G is weighted,
(ii) G is invariant-trade robust,
(iii) G is 22
n
-invariant-trade robust.
Note three features of Theorem 4.7:
(a) It applies tomodels of coalitions instead of coalitions, so each vectorial trading transform frequently representsmultiple
‘‘coalitional’’ trading transforms at the same time.
(b) Only vectorial trading transforms for rows ofM need to be considered.
(c) It does not apply to non-complete simple games, but these games are not swap robust and thus non-weighted games. The
notion of δ-minimal winning coalition is valid for all simple games, and any failure of a non-complete simple game to be
swap robust can be reduced to a new failure in which both involved coalitions are δ-minimal winning coalitions. In other
words, the notion of invariant-swap robustness can be easily extended outside complete games. Indeed, a simple game
is swap robust if and only if it is invariant-swap robust. Therefore we have the following consequence of Theorem 4.7.
Corollary 4.8. Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple game, then G is weighted if and only if G is invariant-trade robust.
5. Games with long failures of invariant-trade robustness
Checking whether a game is weighted by using invariant-trade robustness (Theorem 4.7) instead of trade robustness
is a considerable simplification since the set of δ-minimal winning coalitions is a subset of the set of winning coalitions.
However, the next Theorem 5.1 serves to illustrate the existence of a sequence of games Gm (m ≥ 4) which arem-invariant-
trade robust but neither 2-trade robust nor (m + 1)-invariant-trade robust. Such a result illustrates that the decision to
computationally tackle the problem of checking whether a game is weighted is complex. In practice we have found that
putting both methods together constitutes an effective computational strategy to check whether a game is weighted.
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Theorem 5.1. Let Gm, with m ≥ 4, be the complete simple game with 2m+ 1 voters defined by characteristic invariants
n = (2,m,m− 1), M =
(2 0 1
1 0 m− 1
0 m m− 2
)
.
Then:
(i) Gm is m-invariant-trade robust.
(ii) Gm is not (m+ 1)-invariant-trade robust.
(iii) Gm is not 2-trade robust.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that the game Gm for m ≥ 4 defined by characteristic invariants (n,M) fulfills the
conditions of Theorem 3.9(A), so Gm is, in fact, a complete simple game.
(i) To prove this part we will apply Theorem 4.3. Assume that Gm for m ≥ 4 is not m-invariant-trade robust for some
integer m. Then there exists a trading transform J = 〈x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk〉 with 2 ≤ k ≤ m which is a failure to be k-
invariant-trade robust for Gm and k is minimumwith this property, i.e., Gm is notm-invariant-trade robust but it is (k− 1)-
invariant-trade robust. Without loss of generality we may assume that the elements x1, x2, . . . , xk in J are:
(2, 0, 1) d times
(1, 0,m− 1) e times
(0,m,m− 2) f times
with d+ e+ f = k, d ≥ 0, e ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0.
Claim. f > 0.
Proof of the Claim. Assume f = 0 in J, then it is e = k − d. Summing up the elements for each component of the xs, and
according to Equality (2) we may deduce:
(i) 2d+ (k− d) = d+ k units must be shared in the first components of the ys,
(ii) 0 is the second component of the ys,
(iii) d+ (k− d)(m− 1) = (k− d)(m− 2)+ k units must be shared in the third components of the ys.
Without loss of generality we may assume that the elements y1, y2, . . . , yk in J are:
d′ times (2, 0, 0)
e′ vectors of the form (1, 0,♦i1)
f ′ vectors of the form (0, 0,♦i2)
with d′ + e′ + f ′ = k, d′ ≥ 0, e′ ≥ 0 and f ′ ≥ 0;♦i1 ≤ m− 2 for each i = 1, . . . , e′; and♦i2 ≤ m− 1 for each i = 1, . . . , f ′.
From Equality (2) it follows:
d+ k = 2d′ + e′, (3)
(k− d)(m− 2)+ k =
(
e′∑
i=1
♦i1
)
+
(
f ′∑
i=1
♦i2
)
≤ e′(m− 2)+ d′(m− 1)
= (d′ + f ′)(m− 2)+ f ′
= (k− d′)(m− 2)+ f ′. (4)
It is f ′ < k, otherwise f ′ = k, d′ = e′ = 0 and by Equality (3) it results d+ k = 0 which is not possible because k ≥ 2 (since
the game is not k-invariant-trade robust) and d ≥ 0. Thus, from f ′ < k and Equality (4) it follows k − d < k − d′, which
is equivalent to d > d′. Now, by Equality (3) we have d′ + k < 2d′ + e′, thus k < d′ + e′ which is a contradiction because
d′ + e′ + f ′ = k and f ′ ≥ 0. This proves the Claim.
Assume from now on that Gm for m ≥ 4 is not m-invariant-trade robust for some integer m and J =
〈x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk〉 where 2 ≤ k ≤ m is a minimal failure to be k-invariant-trade robust for Gm and that vectors x1,
x2, . . . , xk in J are
(2, 0, 1) d times
(1, 0,m− 1) e times
(0,m,m− 2) f times
with d+ e+ f = k, d ≥ 0, e ≥ 0 and f > 0 (according to the Claim), that is vector (0,m,m− 2)must appear at least once
in the xs.
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If (0,1,2) is an element in the ys with 1 ≤ m and 2 ≤ m− 2, then we may delete both: (0,m,m− 2) in the xs and
(0,1,2) in the ys provided that we subtractm− 1 units in the second components of some other vectors in the ys and
subtractm−2−2 units in the third components of some vectors ys. As this action can be realized we obtain a failure to be
(k − 1)-invariant-trade robust for Gm, which is a contradiction with the assumed minimality of k. Then the only elements
in the ys having 0 as the first component must be of the form (0,m− 1,m− 1).
If there are no more vectors in the ys having a non-null second component, then by Equality (2) it must be
f m = F (m− 1) (5)
where F stands for the number of vectors in the ys of the form (0,m− 1,m− 1). As g.c.d.(m− 1,m) = 1 and F ≤ k ≤ m
the only solution of Equality (5) is F = m and f = m − 1 provided that k = m. Here all the first components in the ys are
zero, and f = m− 1 implies that d+ e = 1, hence there is at least one vector for the xs with a positive first component but
none vector in the ys with a non-null first component, which is a contradiction with Equality (2).
Therefore, the only elements in the ys having 0 as the first component must be of the form (0,m− 1,m− 1) and there
is at least one element in the ys of the form (1,41,42) with 41 ≥ 1 and 41+42 ≤ m − 2. Then we may delete one
vector of the form (0,m,m− 2) in the xs and, simultaneously, delete one vector of the form (0,m− 1,m− 1) in the ys and,
moreover, subtracting one unit in the second component of vector (1,41,42) and adding one unit in the third component
to get the losing vector (1,41−1,42+1). Thus we obtain a failure to be (k− 1)-invariant-trade robust for Gm, which is a
contradiction with the assumption of minimality for k. We conclude that Gm ism-invariant-trade robust as long asm ≥ 4.
(ii) To see a failure of Gm to be (m+ 1)-invariant-trade robust let us consider a trading transform J in which
(1, 0,m− 1) appears 2 times in the xs
(0,m,m− 2) appears m− 1 times in the xs
and
(2, 0, 0) appears once in the ys
(0,m− 1,m− 1) appears m times in the ys
that is, consider the matricesA and Y withm+ 1 rows each:
A =

1 0 m− 1
1 0 m− 1
0 m m− 2
...
...
...
0 m m− 2
 Y =

2 0 0
0 m− 1 m− 1
...
...
...
0 m− 1 m− 1
 .
Clearly the rows of these matrices fulfill conditions Equality (2). Each row in A corresponds to a winning vector and each
row in Y corresponds to a losing vector. Thus, Gm is not (m+ 1)-invariant-trade robust.
(iii) Consider coalitions S1 and S2 with models (1,m − 2, 1) and (1, 1,m − 2) respectively, to get two losing coalitions
T1 and T2 with models (2, 0, 0) and (0,m− 1,m− 1) respectively. This shows a failure of Gm to be 2-trade robust. 
The results we give in Theorem 5.1 do not include cases for m = 1, 2, 3. If m = 1, 2 then there are 3 and 5 voters,
respectively, and all simple games are weighted (see Tables 2 and 3). If m = 3 then there are 7 voters and, by invariant-
trade robustness, there are 14 games which are 3-invariant-trade robust but not 4-invariant-trade robust (Table 2), and 2 of
them have only 3 equally desirable classes (see Table 5):
n = (2, 2, 3) M =
(
2 1 0
1 0 3
)
and n = (2, 3, 2) M =
(
1 0 2
0 3 1
)
.
On the other hand, by using trade robustness, all simple games with 7 voters are either weighted or non 2-trade robust (see
Table 3).
Finally, we note that if add m′ null voters to the games in Theorem 5.1, then we obtain games with 2m+ 1+ m′ voters
which arem-invariant-trade robust but not (m+1)-invariant-trade robust. Indeed, null voters do not affect the highest level
of trade robustness achieved for a game. Hence, by considering a convenient number of null voters it is possible to obtain
games G′m,m ≥ 2 with O(mα) voters for every α ≥ 1 being m-invariant-trade robust but neither (m + 1)-invariant-trade
robust nor 2-trade robust.
6. A full classification for complete simple games with less than eight voters using two complementary methods
We have made some experiments based on Theorem 4.7. They computationally allow us to determine whether a
complete simple game is weighted. Our programs apply Theorems 2.3 and 4.3 in the context of complete simple games
defined by the four conditions provided in Theorem 3.9(A). They have been written for C++ and run under Linux in Pentium
4 at 1.7 GHz with 512 Mb of RAM. That is to say, given a complete simple game G with characteristic invariants (n,M)
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Table 2
Full classification for complete simple games for n < 8 by invariant-trade robustness
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CG 1 3 8 25 117 1171 44313
WG 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373
not I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 60 14940
not 2-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 57 13915
not 3-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 3 1011
not 4-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
not 5-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3
Full classification for complete simple games for n < 8 by classical trade robustness
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CG 1 3 8 25 117 1171 44313
WG 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373
not T-R 0 0 0 0 0 60 14940
not 2-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 60 14940
not 3-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4
2-I-T-R but not 3-I-T-R complete simple games for n = 6
Vector n MatrixM Matrix Y
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
100101011001
010110
 001111010101
110000

(1, 1, 1, 2, 1)
1001101101
01020
 0012101011
11000

(1, 1, 2, 2)
(
1002
0111
) 00220102
1100

we consider two methods: the one suggested by (vectorial) invariant-trade robustness and the other by (vectorial) trade
robustness.
The (vectorial) invariant-trade robust test performs as follows. For any pair of rows (repeated rows are allowed) ofM,
the algorithm checks whether any system of Equality (2) of Definition 4.4 has solution; if it does then the game is not 2-
invariant-trade robust, if not then the algorithm repeats the same procedure with triples of rows, and so on.
A full classification for invariant-trade robustness of all complete simple games if n < 8 is provided in Table 2: the
number of complete simple games (briefly CG), the number of weighted games (briefly WG), and the number of not m-
invariant-trade robust but (m− 1)-invariant-trade robust games (not k-I-T-R, for short). Finally, the number of complete
games being notweighted is gathered in not invariant-trade robust games (not I-T-R, for short). Unfortunately, the number
of matrices associated to a fixed number n of voters is huge for n > 8. For n = 8 it takes around one hour to determine the
total number of complete games which is 16175188. However, classifying all the games with 8 voters according to whether
they are weighted games or m-invariant-trade robust but not (m + 1)-invariant-trade robust (for each m) spends much
more time.
Alternatively, we can consider the (vectorial) trade robustness test, applying the same steps that for the invariant-trade
robust test but for all the minimal winning models instead of only taking the rows ofM. By using this method we obtain
that for n < 8 voters, a simple game is either weighted or not 2-trade robust (Table 3). The number of games not beingm-trade
robust but (m− 1)-trade robust games is gathered up in k-T-R.
Let us make some considerations of the obtained results in Table 2. For instance, n = 6 is the minimum number of voters
required to achieve simple games which are 2-I-T-R but not 3-I-T-R; n = 7 is the minimum number of voters required to
achieve simple games which are 3-I-T-R but not 4-I-T-R. Tables 4 and 5 below enumerate all these extreme games giving
for them: vector n, matrixM and matrix Y which fulfills Equality (2) and shows a failure to bem-I-T-R:m = 3 for n = 6,
andm = 4 for n = 7.
More broadly, the experiments are successful for a few fixed columns (two or three) or for a few rows (one, two or three).
For instance, games with a single column are all q–out–of–n games, and so are weighted. It is striking that the experiments
show that games with two columns are either weighted or not 2-invariant-trade robust (and, in particular, not 2-trade
robust), which leaves open the following conjecture.
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Table 5
3-I-T-R but not 4-I-T-R complete simple games for n = 7
Vector n MatrixM Matrix Y MatrixM Matrix Y MatrixM Matrix Y MatrixM Matrix Y
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
101000110010100101011
0011101

001101101110001000111
1001001

(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2)
110002101011
011102

011012100112101002
111000

(1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1)
100010010011
001101
 000211001011
011000

(1, 1, 1, 2, 2)
1000201102
01021

001220101201012
11000

(1, 1, 2, 1, 2)
(
10011
01102
) 002120101210002
11000

1000201011
00202

001120011201002
11000

1101010012
01102

002120101211001
11001

1101010200
01102

002120120011001
11001

(1, 1, 2, 2, 1)
1002101101
00220

002110021101021
11000

1010110020
01021

002211001110011
11000

(1, 2, 2, 2)
(
1010
0102
) 002202001001
1001
 (11020221
) 021202121022
1200

(2, 2, 3)
(
210
103
) 023201201
201

(2, 3, 2)
(
102
031
) 022022022
200

Table 6
Number of not k-I-T-R complete simple games with three columns
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CG 0 0 0 6 50 262 1114 4278 15769 58147
not2-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 6 130 1116 6858 35431
not3-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 39 160 506
not4-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 39 115
not5-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11
not6-I-T-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conjecture 6.1. Let G = (N,W) be a complete simple gamewith only two different types of equally desirable voters. Then, either
G = (N,W) is weighted or is not 2-invariant-trade robust.
Instead, for three columns the achieved complexity is extreme by invariant-trade robustness (cf. Theorem 5.1 and
Table 6). Another interesting problem would be finding the minimum number of columns or equi-desirability classes
required for a matrixM to get a game being 2-T-R but not 3-T-R. Taylor and Zwicker [10] gave a game with this property
having 9 equi-desirability classes (and 9 voters too) inM.
7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have given a reformulation of trade robustness for complete simple games (Theorem 4.7). When we try
to apply Theorem 4.7 we obtain an important simplification because we work with profiles representing several coalitions
and only some profiles of minimal winning coalitions need to be taken. However, things are not so simple and we have seen
in Section 5 that there exist games with long failures of invariant-trade robustness but they already fail to be 2-trade robust.
We have also made experiments that allow:
• to provide a total classification of complete simple games for n < 8 voters following the classical method, (vectorial)
trade robustness, and the one proposed in the paper, (vectorial) invariant-trade robustness;
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• to study games with long failures of invariant-trade robustness.
Furthermore, we have implemented successfully algorithms to get results for any particular complete simple game with
a ‘‘reduced’’ number of rows in matrixM.
In the previous section, we have left open a conjecture and a question. It also strikes us a certain symmetry in Table 6,
which might suggest some combinatorial properties.
From a computational viewpoint and for a given game, it is also interesting to study the required CPU time depending
on the number of voters and the number of chosen columns (or rows in its matrixM), and deciding how to combine both
methods (invariant-trade robustness and trade robustness) to efficiently study whether the game is weighted. For instance,
given a game, one method would consist in checking, firstly, if it is 2-invariant-trade robust. If this property fails, the game
is not weighted, if it does not fail we check all new pairs corresponding to winning models. A failure of the last property
means the game is not 2-trade robust, otherwise we will consider all the triples checking 3-invariant-trade robustness, and
we will continue this process (if necessary) with 3-trade robustness, and so on.
Finally, another problem we are working on is, for a fixed number of voters n, to generate random games in the form
(n,M) and study their trade robustness. This kind of experiments are useful to estimate the asymptotic behavior of trade
robustness when the number of voters increases.
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